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ABSTRACT: Motivated by symbolic ideology research and Social Identity Theory, this article introduces an 
original measure of ideological social identity (ISI) designed to capture feelings of psychological attachment to an 
ideological in-group and facilitate analysis of their attitudinal and behavioral effects.  Data from a nationally 
representative sample of survey experiment participants indicates that the ISI scale is empirically distinct from 
ideological self-placement, the standard measure of symbolic ideology, and it conditions the effects of self-
placement on vote choice in actual and hypothetical election scenarios.  Ideological social identity is also common 
within the American public, particularly among conservatives, and responsive to environmental stimuli that make 
ideology salient including electoral competition and “new media” news sources.  In addition to its immediate 
contributions, this research represents a necessary first step toward more fully exploiting the profound theoretical 
and empirical implications of Social Identity Theory in studies of ideological identification.   
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Traditional conceptualizations of ideology’s political functions – according to which individuals should 
derive their political preferences from internally elaborated “belief systems” (see Converse 1964) and engage in 
spatial comparisons to make electoral decisions (Downs 1957) – assume a sophisticated understanding of 
ideological abstractions that is, for the most part, not characteristic of the American public   (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008; but see Achen 1975; 
Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976).  Kinder (1983, p. 416) summarizes: “the political thinking of much of the public 
cannot be adequately described as ideological in the sense of deductive reasoning from an overarching set of 
integrated principles about politics and the social world.” 
 Nonetheless, ideology remains empirically relevant, even essential, to understanding political behavior.  
Ideology is one of the most consistent and powerful predictors of myriad political attitudes and behaviors, including 
vote choice (Jost 2006; Levitin and Miller 1979; Luttbeg and Gant 1985), candidate evaluations (Zaller 1992), 
policy preferences (Feldman 2003; Jacoby 1991), and party identification (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; 
Levendusky 2009).   
 For over a half-century, scholars faced with this apparent disconnect have struggled to characterize 
ideology’s impact on political attitudes and behavior.  One of the most significant efforts to advance this debate 
comes from a line of research that reconceptualizes ideological identification as a symbolic attachment to 
ideological groups not dependent upon, or even necessarily related to, an individual policy orientation.  Primary 
evidence of “symbolic ideology” is found in studies of the “symbolic-operational paradox,” which examine 
Americans’ longstanding and overwhelming preference for conservative self-identification in spite of an aggregate 
preference for liberal policies (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Free and Cantril 1967).  A similar pattern holds at the 
individual level; symbolic ideology (ideological self-identification) and operational ideology (policy preferences) 
are modestly correlated, “suggesting that they are, in fact, different concepts and should be analyzed separately” 
(Popp and Rudolph 2011, Footnote 5).    
 Symbolic ideology scholars primarily attribute ideological identification to the influence of social groups 
and messages.  One of the best predictors of ideological self-identification is an individual’s evaluation of 
ideological groups, and those evaluations largely are based upon attitudes toward the social groups and symbols with 
which an ideological label is most closely associated, e.g. businessmen and the military for conservatives and 
feminists and ethnic minorities for liberals (Conover and Feldman 1981).  In fact, studies indicate that conservative 
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self-identification is primarily a reaction against liberalism and its associated social groups while hostility toward 
conservative groups has become an increasingly powerful predictor of liberal self-identification in recent years 
(Zschirnt 2011).  Social influences figure prominently in scholars’ explanations of the symbolic-operational 
paradox, as well.  Ellis and Stimson (2012) find that Americans’ overwhelming preference for conservative self-
identification is due in large part to extra-political cultural connotations and patterns of elite discourse that favor the 
conservative label and disfavor the liberal label.  Symbolic attachments are also shown to significantly influence 
expressed policy preferences, but their effects are contingent upon social cues from ideological group members; 
absent in-group cues, the relationship between ideological self-identification and policy preference is much weaker 
or not statistically significant (Malka and Lelkes 2010; Popp and Rudolph 2011).   
 Symbolic ideology research helps to clarify the apparent contradiction between evidence showing that the 
American public is lacking in ideological sophistication yet influenced in its political attitudes and behaviors by 
ideological identification.  Contrary to the traditional conceptualization of ideology as, in its meaningful form, an 
internal application of abstract principles (see Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964), symbolic ideology embraces 
the notion that ideology derives much of its explanatory power from the influence of social factors giving meaning 
to ideological labels and direction to ideological group members.  In short, it is an interaction of internal 
categorization and external cues that makes ideology relevant to the political behavior of the mass public.  
Moreover, symbolic ideology does not require a high level of political sophistication; attitudes toward, and 
applications of, ideological labels primarily are based upon symbolic evaluations, not elaborated policy 
orientations.1   
The achievements of symbolic ideology research recommend further theoretical and empirical 
development.  A promising opportunity for such development, for reasons that I elaborate upon below, is found in 
Social Identity Theory (SIT). SIT is one of the most influential theories in the social sciences and in recent years it 
                                                 
1 The symbolic ideology approach, while influential, is hardly universal among scholars; critics argue that 
ideological identifications are primarily based upon substantive policy views rather than symbolic evaluations (see, 
for example, Abramowitz and Saunders 2006).   The present analysis is not designed to demonstrate the superiority 
of either approach, but to refine scholars’ understanding of symbolic ideology with the view that it, as well as 
operational ideology, has significant theoretical and empirical value.   
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has assumed greater prominence in the political science literature, motivating studies of subjects as diverse as 
judicial behavior (Baum 2006), political intolerance (Gibson and Gouws 2000), political participation (Fowler and 
Kam 2007), national identity and patriotism (Althaus and Coe 2011; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009), 
and party identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2005; Greene 1999; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; 
Weisberg and Hasecke 1999).  By emphasizing the attitudinal and behavioral significance of internalized social 
group membership and external social group cues, SIT maps clearly onto the symbolic ideology literature’s 
reconceptualization of ideological identification.  At the same time, the SIT literature includes many theoretical and 
empirical innovations relevant to understanding symbolic ideology, and ideology more generally, but never applied 
toward that end.  In fact, no study in the symbolic ideology literature or elsewhere has directly measured and 
analyzed ideological identification as a social identity.   
The purpose of this analysis is to establish a measure of ideological social identity (ISI), or psychological 
attachment to an ideological in-group, and use it to answer fundamental questions including: How common is ISI 
within the American public?  Who is most, or least, likely to have a strong ISI?  Does ISI vary across environmental 
contexts, and if so how?  Is ISI relevant to understanding political behavior, particularly in relation to the influence 
of ideological identification? The value of such an analysis is twofold: first, evidence of meaningful and 
consequential ideological social identity will further validate symbolic ideology research while also extending it 
theoretically and empirically; second, establishing the reality of ideological social identity in the mass public is a 
necessary first step toward more fully exploiting the theoretical and empirical insights of the SIT literature in future 
studies of ideological identification, as detailed below.   
Data for this analysis come from an original survey experiment conducted among a nationally 
representative participant sample.  Included in the survey experiment are direct measures of ideological social 
identity, as well as measures of relevant demographic and political characteristics, vote choice measures, and 
experimental manipulations designed to capture variation in ISI levels across different electoral contexts.  I use these 
data to test a series of hypotheses addressing the prevalence, causes, and behavioral significance of ideological 
social identity.  The results of this analysis indicate that ISI is an empirically distinct component of ideological 
identification that is prevalent in the mass public and subject to variation, with respect to strength and underlying 
causes, across ideological groups and electoral contexts.  Also, it is behaviorally consequential; ISI conditions the 
effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice in actual and hypothetical elections.   
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Theory 
Henri Tajfel and colleagues developed Social Identity Theory in order to better understand the nature and 
causes of inter-group relations.  Through a series of experimental studies, they demonstrated that mere 
categorization within a social group, once internalized, induces high levels of in-group identification, inter-group 
differentiation, and in-group bias – even if the group is an arbitrary one and participants have no basis for perceiving 
common in-group interests (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, and Bundy 1971; see also Allen and 
Wilder 1975; Brewer and Silver 1978; Doise and Sinclair 1973).  Experimental participants, in effect, were adopting 
a social identity, defined by Tajfel (1978, 63) as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that membership.”     
 Foundational to SIT are two assumptions: first, individuals define themselves in large part by the groups to 
which they belong; second, individuals strive for positive self-evaluation and enhanced self-esteem (Tajfel et al. 
1971; see also Brewer 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987).  In order to positively evaluate 
oneself, then, individuals must also positively evaluate the in-group that in part defines the self.  Thus, social 
identity will motivate an individual toward attitudes and behaviors that promote the in-group, perhaps but not 
necessarily at the expense of the out-group (Brewer 2002), and maintain in-group membership through compliance 
with in-group norms.  In essence, social identity represents a process of depersonalization, “whereby people come to 
perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities” 
(Roccas and Brewer 2002, 50).   
 SIT has significant implications for understanding ideological identification.  Typically, about half of all 
survey respondents identify themselves as liberals or conservatives, and two-thirds identify as moderates, liberals, or 
conservatives.  To the extent that those identities are internalized, as suggested by respondents’ willingness to self-
categorize, SIT research indicates that ideological group members will be psychologically motivated to positively 
evaluate the in-group, maintain in-group norms, and advance in-group interests.2  Opportunities for ideological 
social identity to influence political attitudes and behaviors are numerous and profound.   
                                                 
2 This explanation is not contingent upon a belief in the symbolic ideology view, contested by operational ideology 
advocates, that ideological identification is primarily based upon evaluations of social groups associated with 
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Take, for example, a party primary or general election in which a candidate is perceived to be at odds with 
an intra-party ideological faction: members of the opposing ideological in-group may be less willing to support that 
candidate – through voting, financial contributions, volunteering, or persuasion of other voters – for fear of 
weakening the ideological in-group, in the event that the out-group candidate succeeds, and in turn suffering 
negative personal consequences.  One could imagine this explanation applying to conservative and Tea Party voters 
in the Republican Party primaries and presidential elections of 2008, 2010, and 2012.  Or consider a policy debate in 
which party leaders promote a policy that conflicts with the views of a dominant intra-party ideological faction, such 
as Bill Clinton’s support for welfare reform in the 1990s or George W. Bush’s support for immigration reform in the 
2000s.  To the extent that prominent ideological in-group members, such as radio talk show hosts and interest group 
leaders, voice opposition, individuals might be motivated by ideological social identity to oppose party leaders in 
order to increase the ideological in-group’s chances of successful opposition or at least avoid violating in-group 
norms and destabilizing their self-concept.   
The symbolic ideology literature provides some basis for expecting such effects.  Among other examples, 
Popp and Rudolph (2011) and Malka and Lelkes (2010) show that ideological group cues significantly influence 
individual policy judgments.  Analyzing ideological identification within the framework of Social Identity Theory 
would add theoretical weight to such findings while also opening up new opportunities for theoretical and empirical 
                                                                                                                                                             
ideological labels (Conover and Feldman 1981; Zschirnt 2011; for a critical analysis, see Abramowitz and Saunders 
2006), although that is a view with which I generally agree.  Self-categorization, or internalization of a group 
identity, is sufficient to trigger the social identity processes described above; whether an individual arrives at the 
point of ideological identification based on symbolic evaluations or policy preferences should not be determinative, 
only the fact of self-categorization.  Social identity and its attendant processes are evident among a wide range of 
groups, after all, from those based on arbitrary assignment (see, for example, Tajfel et al. 1971) to those seemingly 
based on social and political convictions, such as feminism (Huddy 1997).  Once an individual develops an 
ideological social identity, however, the ideological in-group becomes a source of psychological and affective 
attachment motivating political behavior based on group considerations rather, or at least more so, than independent 
policy judgments.  In this sense, the ideological in-group takes on a symbolic function regardless of whether it was 
adopted for symbolic or substantive reasons.     
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extension.  For instance, the effects of such cues might be stronger among individuals with a high level of 
ideological social identity, since in-group membership is a more central part of their self-concept, or conversely 
among more moderate members of an ideological group who are amenable to compromise on policy grounds but 
sensitive to the risk of violating in-group norms and destabilizing their self-concept.  Social identity could also help 
to explain how individuals respond when ideological in-group cues conflict with partisan in-group cues; individuals 
with a stronger ideological social identity, relative to partisan social identity, may be more likely to accept the 
ideological in-group cue, and vice versa.     
Also, it is important to note that the symbolic ideology literature typically uses ideological self-placement 
to measure its central concept.  The self-placement scale, however, does not directly measure the in-group 
attachments with which symbolic ideology scholars are concerned; while it does reveal the ideological group within 
which an individual self-categorizes, its most explicit function is to measure ideological extremity, e.g. “slightly 
liberal” versus “liberal” versus “very liberal”.  To isolate the depth and specific effects of in-group attachment 
requires a more sensitive measure explicitly designed toward that end.  The SIT literature provides such empirical 
measures that can be easily adapted to capture ideological in-group attachment, as detailed below.  Moreover, 
interacting the self-placement and ideological social identity measures, as I do in this analysis, enables scholars to 
gauge the behavioral impact of ideological in-group attachments across levels of self-reported ideological extremity.   
 The symbolic ideology literature itself attests to the relevance of Social Identity Theory.  Ellis and Stimson 
(2012) title Section 6.3 of Ideology in America “Another Explanation, Part 2: ‘Conservatism’ As Social Identity.”  
However, the authors do not situate their analysis within the SIT literature and they operationalize social identity 
using child-rearing values that are most commonly associated with authoritarianism (see Hetherington and Weiler 
2009).  Malka and Lelkes (2010, 160), on the other hand, draw heavily upon the SIT literature in their description of 
ideology’s effects, explaining at one point that “A self-categorization as ‘conservative’… will constitute a social 
identity when one’s self-perception as conservative is experienced as a point of similarity with other ingroup 
members and as a point of collective difference with outgroup members.”   However, Malka and Lelkes make no 
direct use of social identity measures, instead operationalizing ideological identification as self-placement.  In short, 
the concept of ideological social identity is not new to the symbolic ideology literature but it is quite 
underdeveloped.  I aim to develop the concept through direct measurement and analysis of ideological social 
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identity, and in doing so to provide a valuable theoretical and empirical extension of the symbolic ideology literature 
amenable to advancement through future research.  
 
Hypotheses 
 The first objective of this analysis is to establish a valid measure of ideological social identity.  The 
traditional measure of ideological identification, used throughout the symbolic ideology literature and the political 
science literature more broadly, is the self-placement scale that typically asks respondents to place themselves on a 
seven-point ideological continuum ranging from very liberal to very conservative.  The self-placement scale is 
explicitly designed to measure ideological extremity, which is qualitatively different from feelings of psychological 
attachment to an ideological in-group.  Indeed, there is no basis in the SIT literature for expecting ideological social 
identity to be exclusive to extreme ideologues; self-categorization alone is sufficient to produce social identity and 
its attendant effects (Tajfel et al. 1971).  Of course, it does stand to reason that ideological extremists will tend to 
feel more passionately about politics and thus find political in-groups more relevant to self-definition.  Given these 
considerations, I expect self-placement and ISI measures to be empirically related but also clearly distinguishable; 
specifically, I hypothesize a statistically significant but modest correlation between the two scales.   
 The next objective of this analysis is to estimate the prevalence of ideological social identity in the mass 
public.  I hypothesize that a substantial proportion of ideological identifiers will score at least moderately on the ISI 
scale and that their mean ISI score will exceed the scale’s median value, given the SIT literature’s finding that self-
categorization within a social group is sufficient to produce feelings of social identity.   
 The SIT literature also indicates that the strength of a social identity may vary in response to environmental 
stimuli and individual characteristics; in particular, an increase in the contextual salience of a relevant identity group 
is positively associated with levels of social identity and inter-group bias (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, 
and Rust 1993; Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992; Oakes 1987).  A number of hypotheses follow from this empirical 
finding.  First, ISI levels should be higher when individuals are primed to think about electoral competition, and 
particularly party primaries in which ideological differences often constitute the major cleavage between candidates.  
Second, ISI levels should be highest among self-identified conservatives since elite discourse is characterized by a 
disproportionate and generally positive use of the conservative label (Ellis and Stimson 2012).  Third, ISI levels 
should be higher among individuals who use a great deal of new media sources such as cable news, talk radio, and 
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internet blogs, since those sources tend to be more ideological in nature than traditional news sources such as 
newspapers, network television news, and local television news.  In essence, I assume that each of these factors 
increase ideology’s salience to the individual in question, and in turn strengthens ideological social identity.3   
Finally, I hypothesize an interaction effect whereby ideological social identity conditions the impact of 
ideological self-placement on vote choice; specifically, for individuals with an ideological social identity that is at 
least moderate in strength, I expect the effects of self-placement to be statistically significant and to strengthen as ISI 
strengthens.  The more conventional alternative, of course, would be to test the direct effects of ISI on vote choice.  
However, doing so would entail treating self-placement merely as a statistical control.  To the contrary, the effects of 
these two components of ideological identification are more likely to be complementary than independent; a very 
conservative individual with a strong ideological social identity has greater motivation to support a conservative 
candidate than a slightly conservative individual with a strong social identity or a very conservative individual with 
a weak social identity.  In short, ideological social identity should reinforce the effects of ideological self-placement, 
and vice versa.  This approach is also consistent with my goal of extending, not fundamentally challenging, 
symbolic ideology research.  Rather than model ISI as an alternative to self-placement, and argue that the former 
should supplant the latter, I interact the two measures in hopes of a more constructive result: clarifying the 
conditions under which self-placement – the standard measure of symbolic ideology – is empirically relevant to vote 
choice, and when its effects are strongest and weakest.   
 
 
                                                 
3 Iyengar et al. (2012) adopt a similar approach in their study of partisan affective polarization, explaining: “the 
more salient the affiliation, the more biased the individual’s beliefs about in-group and out-group members.  
Salience itself can depend on either dispositional factors… or characteristics of the information environment…” 
(407-408).  Their analysis indicates that campaign environments have the effect of strengthening partisan identities 
and confirming partisan stereotypes; in particular, exposure to negative campaign advertisements is a statistically 
significant and positive predictor of affective polarization.  Thus, I find in this research direct support for 
emphasizing the role of salience in social identity processes, and indirect support for the hypothesized effects of 
electoral competition and exposure to more ideologically-biased media sources on ideological social identity.   
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Data & Empirical Methods 
 Data for this analysis come from an original online survey experiment that was administered by Knowledge 
Networks (KN)4 and funded with financial support from Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences 
(TESS).5  KN selected 1,666 potential participants from its ongoing Knowledge Panel for e-mail solicitation in April 
2010, 66% of whom completed the survey experiment for a total sample of 1,089 participants.6   
 The survey experiment included three experimental manipulations following a 3 (election condition) x 2 
(social identity question order) 7 x 2 (candidate presentation order)8, between-groups factorial design.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to each condition.  The first manipulation was designed to test variation in ideological 
social identity levels across electoral contexts, and to measure vote choice in a controlled information environment.  
For this manipulation, treatment group participants read an experimental stimulus, provided in this article’s 
                                                 
4 Knowledge Networks uses random-digit dial and address-based sampling methods to recruit a representative group 
of Americans into its Knowledge Panel.  KN also provides Internet access and hardware, including computers, when 
needed in order to facilitate representative sampling. 
5 TESS uses funds from a National Science Foundation grant (SES-0818839) to provide financial support for 
scholars to conduct online survey experiments among nationally representative participant samples.  For more 
information, see www.tessexperiments.org.  
6 Knowledge Networks included a post-stratification weight in the deliverable data to correct for demographic 
unrepresentativeness.  I use this weight in my analysis when appropriate.   
7 I included this manipulation to test whether social identity levels varied depending on the order in which 
participants completed ISI versus PSI items.  One-way ANOVAs show no such effect.  I exclude this manipulation 
from further analysis. 
8 This manipulation randomly varied the order in which participants read about party candidates in the general 
election condition or ideological candidates in the party primary conditions.  There is no reason to expect that 
candidate order influences reported social identity levels.  It could, however, affect vote choice and so I include it in 
the experimental election vote choice model. 
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appendix, describing a hypothetical general election or party primary for a U.S. Senate seat. 9  The general election 
(party primary) stimulus characterized the two candidates in terms of their partisan affiliations (ideological 
reputations), major campaign themes, and the implications of each candidate’s victory for the partisan (ideological) 
direction of the country (party).  Immediately after reading the stimulus, treatment group participants were asked to 
report the candidate for whom they would vote in the election.   Control group participants read no election stimulus 
and so they were not presented with a hypothetical vote choice question.    
 To measure ideological social identity in this survey, I adapted Mael and Tetrick’s (1992) Identification 
with a Psychological Group (IDPG) scale.  The IDPG is an empirically robust and demonstrably valid measure of 
social identity (see Brewer and Silver 2000) utilized often in the social science literatures and in many previous 
studies of partisan social identity (see Green et al. 2005; Greene 1999; Weisberg and Hasecke 1999).  The full IDPG 
scale consists of ten statements with which participants state their level of agreement on a seven-point scale ranging 
from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”   Space and cost constraints necessitated including a three-item 
IDPG subset in the survey experiment,10 consisting of the following statements: “When someone praises (this 
group), it feels to me like a personal compliment”; “(This group’s) successes are my successes”; “If a prominent 
(member of this group) got caught in a scandal, I would not feel embarrassed at all” (reversed).  I inserted partisan 
labels (Republicans/Democrats/Independents) in the parentheses when measuring partisan social identity and 
ideological labels (political conservatives/ political liberals/ political moderates) when measuring ideological social 
identity.11   
                                                 
9 Participants in the latter condition were assigned to party primaries based on reported party affiliation in the KN 
profile data: Republican (Democratic) identifiers read about a Republican (Democratic) primary and Independents 
were randomly assigned to either party’s primary.  
10 Green et al. (2005) use a three-item subset of the IDPG scale, and Weisberg and Hasecke (1999) four items, to 
study partisan social identity.  Both scales prove to be valid and reliable. 
11 Participants completed one set of PSI measures and one set of ISI measures, corresponding to their partisan and 
ideological affiliations as previously reported in the KN profile data.   
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 The social identity scales used in this analysis consist of the “compliment” and “success” items only.  I 
exclude the “scandal” item from analysis due to its poor reliability.12  The two-item scale proves to be a reliable 
measure of social identity for all partisan and ideological groups, with Cronbach’s Alpha estimates of 0.78 for 
conservatives, moderates, and Republicans; 0.77 for Democrats; 0.75 for liberals; and 0.67 for Independents.13  To 
create ISI and PSI scores, I coded each participant’s response to the relevant “success” and “praise” items as ranging 
from one (weakest social identity) to seven (strongest social identity) and then calculated participants’ average 
scores on the two scales.   
I test the hypothesized causes of variation in ideological social identity levels using a linear regression 
model.  The key independent variables in this model represent assignment to the general election treatment group, 
coded one if treated and zero otherwise; assignment to the party primary treatment group, coded one if treated and 
zero otherwise;14 and self-reported weekly exposure to six different types of news sources, including network 
television news, local television news, cable television news, newspapers, radio news, and blogs, each coded from 
zero (never) to four (three times a week or more).  Additional independent variables include: a folded ideological 
self-placement scale, coded from zero (moderate) to three (very liberal/conservative); a folded party identification 
scale, coded from zero (independent) to three (strong Democrat/Republican); age, coded continuously; education, 
coded from one (eighth grade education) to eleven (professional or doctoral degree); religious attendance, coded 
from zero (never) to five (more than once a week); annual household income, coded from zero (less than $5,000) to 
                                                 
12 Cronbach’s Alpha estimates range between 0.02 and 0.48 when pairing the scandal item with either of the other 
two items, well below acceptable reliability standards.   
13 As an additional check on the performance of the two-item scale, I used data from a related study of 2008 national 
party convention delegates that included five social identity measures: the three already described plus two 
additional measures adapted from the IDPG.  The compliment-success scale performs exceptionally well in this 
analysis.  As a measure of liberal, conservative, and Democratic – but not Republican – social identity, this scale 
performs far better than any other two-item scale combination, and better than expanded scales including all five 
items or four after excluding the scandal item.   
14 Control group participants constitute the baseline category in this analysis, since they are coded zero for both of 
the electoral condition dummy variables. 
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eighteen ($175,000 or more); gender, coded one for female and zero for male; race, coded one for white and zero for 
non-white.   
Next, I test the hypothesized interaction effect of ideological social identity and ideological self-placement 
on vote choice, using two logistic regression models.  The first model predicts vote choice in the hypothetical Senate 
general election, for participants in that treatment group only.  The second model predicts vote choice in the 2008 
presidential election for all participants, using information previously reported in the Knowledge Panel profile data.  
Votes for a Democratic candidate are coded one and votes for a Republican candidate are coded zero.   
 The key independent variables in these models are ideological self-placement, ideological social identity, 
and the interaction of both scales.  The self-placement scale is coded to range from one (very liberal) to seven (very 
conservative).   The ISI scale is coded to range from one (weakest social identity) to seven (strongest social 
identity).  The interaction term multiplies a participant’s score on both of these scales.  Additional independent 
variables include: party identification, ranging from one (Strong Democrat) to seven (Strong Republican); a partisan 
social identity scale, constructed in the same manner as the ISI scale; age, gender, race, education, religious 
attendance, and income variables coded as described above.  Finally, to control for potential order effects, I include 
a variable in the hypothetical Senate election model representing the order in which participants read about the 
candidates, coded one if the Republican candidate preceded the Democratic candidate and zero if the Democratic 
candidate preceded the Republican candidate.   
 
Results 
 As hypothesized, the correlation between ISI and self-placement is statistically significant but modest in 
magnitude, at 0.283.  Disaggregating by ideological groups reveals a somewhat higher correlation for conservatives 
(0.322) than for liberals (0.232), but no substantive differences from the overall finding.  The correlation between 
scales is too low for them to be measuring the same concept, unless perhaps a high level of measurement error is 
disguising their redundancy.  If, however, one or both measures were contaminated by a great deal of error, one 
would expect to find a less consistent and predictable relationship than is evident: comparing across the ideological 
self-placement scale, the mean ISI score is highest for very liberal/conservative participants (4.82), followed by 
liberal/conservative participants (4.60), followed by slightly liberal/conservative participants (3.88).  The same 
pattern holds when analyzing liberals and conservatives, separately.  In other words, ideological extremity on one 
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measure tracks ideological extremity on the other measure – an indication of construct validity, I would argue.  The 
relationship between the two scales is perfectly consistent with the argument that they tap distinct dimensions of the 
same underlying concept (ideological identification): ideological self-placement and ideological social identity vary 
systematically, and in a predictable pattern, while correlating only modestly.   
 Next, I use the data from my nationally representative participant sample to estimate ISI levels in the mass 
public.  The kernel density plot in Figure 1 shows that a sizable proportion of ideological identifiers, in general, have 
what could be reasonably characterized as an ideological social identity.  In the aggregate, 41.5% of participants 
score above the ISI scale’s neutral point (“neither agree nor disagree”) and nearly 29% at least slightly agree with 
the ISI statements, on average.  More concretely, a t-test reveals that the mean ISI score for all participants (M = 
4.21, SD = 1.20) is significantly higher than the scale’s neutral point of four, t(1079) = 5.68, p = 0.000.  Thus, on 
average, participants exhibit at least a moderate degree of ideological social identity.15  
[Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 also plots separate ISI scores for liberals, conservatives, and moderates.  The data provide initial 
support for the hypothesis that conservatives have stronger ideological social identities, on average, than liberals and 
moderates.  A majority of conservatives score above the ISI scale’s neutral point and 40% of conservatives at least 
slightly agree with the ISI statements, on average, in both cases exceeding liberal and moderate performance.  
                                                 
15 Ideological social identity, it should be noted, proves not to be a proxy for partisan social identity.  Although the 
two variables are highly correlated, at 0.619, this correlation is almost identical to that of the traditional ideological 
and partisan self-placement measures, at 0.603.  Moreover, a majority of participants have distinct scores on the ISI 
and PSI scales, with more than a quarter (27.4%) exhibiting a stronger ideological than partisan social identity.  In 
fact, participants identifying as conservatives and Republicans score significantly higher in terms of ideological 
social identity (M = 4.62, SD = 1.20) than they do in terms of partisan social identity (M = 4.40, SD = 1.15), t(350) = 
4.19, p = 0.000, while moderate Independents score significantly higher on PSI (M = 4.10, SD = 1.04) than on ISI 
(M = 3.60, SD = 1.01), t(48) = -3.54, p = 0.001.  Also, liberal Democrats have a higher PSI (M = 4.46, SD = 1.22) 
than ISI, but this difference reaches only marginal levels of statistical significance (M = 4.33, SD = 1.22) t(211) = -
1.83, p = 0.070.  Thus, while ideological and partisan social identities are empirically related, they do represent 
distinct constructs and warrant distinct analysis here as well as within the political science literature at large.  
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According to one-way ANOVAs, conservatives (M = 4.44, SD = 1.25) do, in fact, score significantly higher than 
moderates on the ISI scale (M = 3.91, SD = 1.07), F (1, 826) = 42.67, p = 0.000.  However, the difference between 
conservative and liberal (M = 4.25, SD = 1.21) scores falls just short of conventional significance levels, F(1, 698) = 
3.57, p = 0.059.16  Taken together, this evidence indicates that conservatives typically have somewhat stronger 
ideological social identity than liberals but the difference between them is quantitative rather than qualitative; ISI is 
common to both liberals and conservatives, with the latter’s advantage being marginally significant.17 
 Next I test two other hypothesized causes of variation in ideological social identity levels through linear 
regression analysis: the salience of electoral competition and exposure to “new media” news sources.  Also included 
in these models are a series of demographic and political variables relevant to ideological identification and thus 
capable of influencing ISI levels.  The value of this analysis, in essence, is to identify who is most likely to have a 
strong (or weak) ideological social identity, and when ISI is strongest.  To provide general conclusions about the 
causes of variation in ISI, first I test this model among all participants.  Then, to detect potential differences between 
ideological groups, I separately test the same model among conservative, liberal, or moderate participants only.    
 Table 1 presents the results of the linear regression models, beginning with the full participant sample in 
Column 1.  The results in Column 1 generally confirm the hypothesized impact of electoral competition and new 
media exposure on ISI levels.  First, in comparison to the excluded category of control group participants, who read 
no experimental stimulus priming thoughts of electoral competition, participants in the general election and party 
                                                 
16 Conservatives and liberals’ mean ISI scores exceed the ISI scale’s neutral point of four at the 0.001 significance 
level, according to t-tests.  Moderates’ mean ISI score does not differ significantly from the neutral point (p = 
0.958). 
17 While ISI levels are lowest among moderates, some of these respondents do exhibit a strong ideological social 
identity: 26.8% of moderates score above the scale’s midpoint, and 15.8% at least slightly agree with the ISI 
statements.  Given the prevalence of ideological moderates in the mass public, including 35.5% of the survey 
experiment sample, moderate social identity could be politically significant.  For instance, moderate social identity 
may help to empirically explain responses to partisan and ideological polarization such as third-party voting and 
ticket-splitting.  Future research would be useful in exploring such effects. 
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primary treatment groups exhibit statistically significant increases in ideological social identity levels.  This finding 
is consistent with research in the SIT literature indicating that social identity becomes stronger in response to 
environmental stimuli that make the relevant identity more salient.  However, contrary to my expectations, the 
magnitude of that increase is essentially equal for participants exposed to a general election stimulus, which refers 
only to party competition, and participants exposed to a party primary stimulus, which explicitly references 
competition between ideological groups.  Apparently, electoral competition in general strengthens ideological social 
identity, regardless of whether ideological groups are made implicitly or explicitly salient.   
[Table 1 here] 
New media exposure also predicts increased ideological social identity; the cable television news and 
internet blog variables are statistically significant and positively signed in Column 1, while talk radio and each of the 
traditional news variables are not significant.  This finding is most likely attributable to the ideological nature of 
many cable news programs and blogs.  Of course, the same can be said about talk radio, which is not a significant 
predictor of ISI.  Perhaps this discrepancy is due to the diversity of talk radio, which includes not only ideological 
news programs but also traditional news programming such as National Public Radio and local news, as well as 
numerous sports programs and stations.   
 Other statistically significant variables in the full sample model include gender, age, and the folded party 
identification and ideological self-placement measures.  Males and older people exhibit higher levels of ISI.  Also, 
not surprisingly given the preceding analysis, more partisan and ideological participants exhibit higher levels of ISI.  
Ideological self-placement’s effects provide additional insight into the empirical relationship between that variable 
and ideological social identity; whereas preceding evidence of the relationship is merely correlational, the results 
from Table 1 demonstrate that it is robust to a substantial battery of relevant covariates.  Yet, at the same time, the 
relationship is hardly determinative, given the size of self-placement’s coefficient (0.260) and the independent 
effects of other significant variables in the model.  These results further indicate that ideological self-placement and 
ideological social identity are empirically related yet distinct constructs.   
The variable most notable for not reaching statistical significance is education.  Political behavior models 
often use education as a proxy for political sophistication (see, for example, Zaller 1992), and it is a common finding 
in political science research that political sophisticates understand and utilize ideological concepts more capably 
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than non-sophisticates (Jacoby 1991; Knight 1985).  Education’s failure to reach statistical significance in this 
analysis indicates that ideological social identity is not generally limited to political sophisticates.18 
 The second, third, and fourth columns of Table 1 present results from the same empirical model, tested 
respectively among conservative, liberal, and moderate identifiers.  Comparing across models provides the 
opportunity to identify variation in the factors predicting ISI for different ideological groups.  Indeed, the 
hypothesized effects of electoral competition and new media exposure vary across ideological groups.  In terms of 
the former, assignment to the general election and party primary conditions is a statistically significant predictor of 
increased conservative and moderate social identity.  However, neither variable is significant in the liberal social 
identity model.  The explanation for this discrepant result is unclear, and worthy of future analysis given its 
departure from the empirical findings of the SIT literature.  The effect among conservatives and moderates, 
however, is consistent with expectations and also worthy of further analysis.  In particular, the finding that party 
primaries strengthen ISI among conservatives and moderates has important implications for scholars’ understanding 
of partisan polarization.  To the extent that increased ideological social identity among these groups leads to greater 
inter-group bias in behavior and attitudes, as the SIT literature would predict, this finding might help to explain 
polarized attitudes and voting preferences within parties, particularly among conservatives and moderates of the 
Republican Party, and their downstream effects on general elections and governance.  Specifically, as ideological 
divisions within the party become more salient, ideological social identity and its attendant effects become more 
pronounced among ideologues as well as moderates.  Since ideologues typically dominate primary electorates, 
however, the end result is likely to be decreased support for moderate candidates and policies and increased support 
for more ideological candidates and policies, thus leading to greater polarization within and later between the 
parties.  Given recent debates among scholars over the extent and causes of mass polarization (see, for example, 
Abramowitz 2010; Fiorina and Abrams 2008), this relationship is well worth exploring in future research.   
The effects of new media exposure also vary across ideological groups: cable news exposure is a 
significant and positive predictor of conservative and moderate social identity only, while blog exposure is a 
significant and positive predictor of liberal social identity only.  A possible explanation for the discrepancy between 
                                                 
18 Additional ANOVA tests confirm that ISI does not vary significantly across education levels, when measuring 
education across its full range or as a median-split dichotomous variable.   
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liberals and conservatives is that the former rely more upon blogs, such as the Daily Kos and Firedoglake, for 
ideological content while the latter rely more upon cable news programs, such as Fox News’ Hannity and The 
O’Reilly Factor, for ideological content.  Again, the explanation for this discrepancy is a worthy topic for further 
research.  Also, it is worth noting that the only traditional news source to reach statistical significance in these 
models, local television news, is negatively associated with moderate social identity.  The explanation for this 
finding is not immediately clear; perhaps the relative lack of ideological salience in local news coverage depresses 
social identity for moderates who use it as their primary news source.     
Among the other variables included in these models, the folded ideological self-placement scale is a 
statistically significant and positive predictor of conservative and liberal social identity,19 while the folded party 
identification scale is a statistically significant and positive predictor of liberal and moderate social identity but only 
a marginal and positive predictor of conservative social identity.  The only other variable to reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance in any of these models is education, which positively predicts liberal social identity.  
For reasons detailed above, this is a particularly interesting finding.  All other tests indicate that a high level of 
education, and by proxy political sophistication, does not influence the strength of an ideological social identity.  
However, for liberals it is relevant; more educated, or sophisticated, liberals tend to feel a greater sense of 
psychological attachment to their ideological in-group.  Absent further research, I can only speculate as to why this 
is the case.  A plausible explanation is that the one-sided and negative nature of social messages concerning the 
liberal label, including elite ideological discourse and extra-political connotations, discourages strong and positive 
attachment to that label except or less so among those individuals who possess sufficient political sophistication to 
evaluate the liberal in-group based upon an advanced understanding of shared policy preferences and values.  Once 
more, further research would be useful in developing a more concrete explanation for this finding. 
Having analyzed the validity, prevalence, and causes for variation in ideological social identity, the final 
objective of this analysis is to evaluate its impact on political behavior.  To do so, in accordance with the hypothesis 
described above, I estimate two logistic regression models testing the interaction effect of ideological social identity 
and ideological self-placement on vote choice in a hypothetical U.S. Senate election, described to participants in the 
                                                 
19 Folded ideological self-placement is excluded from the moderate social identity model, since moderate identifiers 
inhabit a single position on the scale and this precludes variation.  
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experimental general election condition, and in the 2008 presidential election.  The results of the hypothetical vote 
choice model are presented in the first column of Table 2, and the results of the presidential vote choice model are 
presented in the second column.    
[Table 2 here] 
Several variables in Table 2 reach conventional levels of statistical significance, including party 
identification and education, in both models; age, in the experimental vote choice model; and gender and race, in the 
presidential vote choice model.  Following conventional methodological precedent, I do not substantively interpret 
the coefficients and significance levels of the lower-order interaction variables or the interaction term since it 
comprises two continuous variables (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 2004).  Instead, I use 
graphs of the interaction effect to evaluate it.20 
 Figures 2 and 3 plot the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice across levels of 
ideological social identity.  The solid line in each figure represents the marginal effect of self-placement on vote 
choice in that election, as a participant’s ISI increases, and the dashed lines represent the upper and lower 95% 
confidence intervals for the marginal effect.  Ideological self-placement’s effect on vote choice is statistically 
significant at any point on the ideological social identity scale that the 95% confidence intervals do not include a 
value of zero.   
[Figure 2 here] 
 Figure 2 shows that the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice is statistically 
significant only at or above the midpoint of the ideological social identity scale (four), in the hypothetical Senate 
election.  Thus, for participants with a weak psychological attachment to their ideological in-group, self-placement 
on the ideological scale does not significantly influence vote choice in this election.  However, for participants with 
a moderate to strong ISI, a majority of the survey experiment sample, self-placement does significantly influence 
vote choice.  These results provide initial support for the hypothesized interaction effect; ideological self-placement 
                                                 
20 Likelihood ratio tests provide an additional indicator of ideological social identity’s empirical contribution.  These 
tests confirm that the addition of the ISI and interaction variables significantly improves model fit, both in the 
hypothetical Senate vote choice model and in the 2008 presidential vote choice model, at the 0.05 confidence level.    
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influences vote choice, but only insofar as an individual also feels at least moderate psychological attachment to the 
ideological in-group.   
[Figure 3 here] 
Figure 3 provides additional support for the hypothesized interaction effect, this time using data from an 
actual election.  The marginal effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice in the 2008 presidential election 
becomes statistically significant starting at a score of 2.5 on the ISI scale.  Thus, self-placement has no discernible 
effect on vote choice for participants with very weak psychological attachment to an ideological in-group, while it 
does have a significant effect for participants with moderately weak to very strong ISI. 
 For a more precise estimation of the interaction effect, in Table 3 I present the predicted probabilities of 
voting for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 presidential election and the experimental general election.  For 
both models, I predict the probability of voting for a given candidate at each category of ideological self-placement, 
and at the neutral and maximum values of ideological social identity.  When calculating predicted probabilities, all 
variables are held at their mean or modal values except for ideological self-placement, ISI, and the interaction term.   
[Table 3 here] 
In both elections, the predicted probability of voting for a Democratic candidate changes in the expected 
direction when moving from the midpoint to the maximum of the ISI scale and holding self-placement constant.  
The predicted probability of voting for the Democratic candidate increases as ISI becomes stronger for very liberal, 
liberal, and slightly liberal participants, excepting only slightly liberal participants in the 2008 presidential election.  
Likewise, the predicted probability of voting for the Democratic candidate decreases as ISI becomes stronger for 
very conservative, conservative, and slightly conservative participants, in both elections.    
 The pattern of change in predicted probabilities varies substantially between the two vote choice models, 
with conservatives showing greater change across ISI values in the presidential election and liberals showing 
slightly greater change across ISI values in the hypothetical Senate election.  Also, the change in predicted 
probabilities for liberals is far greater in the experimental general election than in the presidential election, while it 
differs minimally for conservatives between the two elections.  Barack Obama’s advantage in the 2008 election 
might help to explain these discrepancies; liberals at all levels of ideological extremity and ideological social 
identity were especially likely to vote for the Democratic candidate under unusually favorable electoral conditions, 
while conservatives were more susceptible to variation given unfavorable electoral conditions and a Republican 
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nominee oft-maligned for ideological unorthodoxy.  In any case, the essential conclusion from both models is the 
same: ideological self-placement’s effect on vote choice is not statistically significant when ideological social 
identity is weak, and it becomes stronger as ideological social identity also becomes stronger.  As expected, these 
two distinct but related components of ideological identification reinforce one another, motivating more 
ideologically consistent behavior as extremity increases.   
To explain this relationship more clearly, I would argue that ideological social identity represents an 
additional motivation not to defect from an ideological in-group and, in this case, support the out-group’s candidate.  
An individual who is, for example, very conservative is unlikely to vote for an out-group candidate on the basis of 
symbolic preference alone.  However, when tempted the individual is less likely to actually defect if he or she feels a 
strong sense of psychological attachment to the ideological in-group.  To do so would not only go against in-group 
interests that reflect upon self-evaluation, but it would be a violation of group norms that jeopardizes a valued in-
group membership and thus risks the significant psychological discomfort of destabilizing the self-concept.  The 
psychological incentive to engage in ideologically consistent behavior therefore weighs more heavily on individuals 
with a strong, versus weak or nonexistent, ideological social identity. 
Such an explanation of ideology’s impact on political behavior has not been previously established in the 
symbolic ideology literature, primarily due to its reliance upon ideological self-placement as a measure of the central 
concept.  Indeed, the symbolic ideology literature, to date, has not adequately addressed the conceptual and 
empirical shortcomings of measuring ideological in-group attachment through ideological self-placement.  The 
fundamental contribution of this article is to develop a credible, direct measure of ideological in-group attachment 
and through its empirical application clarify the conditional nature of ideological self-identification’s impact on vote 
choice, with potential expansion to other political behavior and attitudes. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of this analysis underscore ideological social identity’s theoretical and empirical potential to 
expand scholars’ understanding of ideological identification, in general, and symbolic ideology, in particular.  The 
ISI scale is derived from a valid and reliable measure of social identity used prominently within the SIT literature, 
and evidence indicates that it is empirically distinct from the ideological self-placement scale that is standard within 
symbolic ideology research.  According to data obtained from a nationally representative survey experiment sample, 
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ideological social identity is common within the American public; in fact, the mean ISI score among ideological 
identifiers significantly exceeds the scale’s neutral point, and nearly one-third of participants at least slightly agree 
with statements tapping psychological attachment to an ideological in-group.   
 This analysis also identifies who is most likely to hold a strong ideological social identity, and when those 
identities are strengthened by environmental stimuli.  Comparing across ideological groups, ISI is strongest among 
conservatives and weakest among moderates.  Feelings of psychological attachment to an ideological in-group are 
not, however, exclusive to conservatives; liberals and conservatives, on average, score significantly higher than the 
neutral point on the ISI scale.  ISI also is not exclusive to sophisticates; education does not significantly predict the 
strength of ideological social identity, in general, although it is significantly and positively related to liberal social 
identity.  I also find evidence that ISI is responsive to environmental stimuli that increase the salience of ideological 
concepts.  In general, participants who read experimental stimuli describing a hypothetical general election or party 
primary scored significantly higher on the ISI scale, and about equally so between conditions, although this effect is 
not found among liberal identifiers.  The effect of party primaries on ideological social identity, for moderates and 
conservatives, potentially has significant implications for scholars’ understanding of partisan polarization, as it may 
help to explain moderates’ struggles to win party nominations and subsequent office; to the extent that primaries 
stimulate increased ISI, ideological majorities are more likely to view moderates within their party as an out-group 
and discriminate accordingly.   Participants who frequently use “new media” news sources, such as cable television 
news and internet blogs, score significantly higher on the ISI scale as well; exposure to cable news is associated with 
increased conservative social identity, and exposure to blogs is associated with increased liberal social identity.    
 Finally, ideological social identity has a meaningful impact on vote choice and in a way that has significant 
implications for the symbolic ideology literature.  Whereas symbolic ideology studies routinely test the direct effects 
of ideological self-placement on political attitudes and behavior, an interaction of self-placement with the ISI scale 
shows evidence of a conditioning effect.  Specifically, self-placement’s effects on vote choice are limited to 
participants who feel at least a moderate degree of psychological attachment to their ideological in-group, and the 
effects of self-placement increase as ideological social identity increases.  The value of this empirical finding is not 
to challenge the utility of the ideological self-placement scale or to recommend its replacement as a measure of 
symbolic ideology, but to identify the conditions under which self-placement’s effects are limited or strengthened by 
other aspects of ideological identification.  Also, from a methodological standpoint, this analysis underscores the 
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potential for, and value of, developing more direct measures of ideological in-group attachment than the self-
placement scale that is standard in symbolic ideology research.  These contributions have significant potential to 
improve scholars’ understanding and measurement of symbolic ideology and its behavioral significance.  To further 
understand the nature and significance of ideological social identity, future analyses should also include measures of 
operational ideology, such as issue preferences, in their predictive models.  Data limitations preclude such an 
analysis in this article.  However, if it were carried out, I would expect to find that the effects of ISI are robust to the 
inclusion of operational ideology measures; the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this article provide no 
basis for expecting otherwise.21   
 Most importantly, ideological social identity represents a valuable opportunity for the theoretical extension 
of symbolic ideology research.  Social Identity Theory and symbolic ideology share many commonalities, in 
particular their emphasis on the interaction between internal categorization and external group cues.  Indeed, a 
number of symbolic ideology scholars have invoked the language and theoretical assumptions of SIT to explain the 
nature of ideological identification.  To this point, though, the symbolic ideology literature’s incorporation of Social 
Identity Theory has been underdeveloped and implicit more so than explicit.  By directly measuring ideological 
                                                 
21 To provide some initial insight into this relationship, in separate analyses of ANES data I created an approximate 
measure of ISI by calculating the difference between liberal or conservative respondents’ feeling thermometer 
ratings of their ideological in-group and out-group, such that a higher relative rating of the in-group indicates a 
higher level of ISI.  It is worth noting that Iyengar et al. (2012) use a parallel strategy to measure partisan affective 
polarization (see Figure 3 and Table 3-5), a concept framed explicitly in terms of Social Identity Theory.  Logistic 
regression models predicting vote choice in the 1984-2008 presidential elections yield results remarkably similar to 
those presented in this analysis and consistent across elections; even when controlling on five operational ideology 
measures (government spending and services; health care; abortion; defense spending; government aid to African-
Americans), as well as relevant political and demographic variables, the marginal effect of ideological self-
placement on presidential vote choice is statistically significant but only for respondents with at least a moderately 
strong (approximated) ISI, and its effects become stronger as ISI become stronger.  One or more of the five 
operational ideology measures is also statistically significant in each vote choice model, attesting to the at least 
somewhat independent effects of these operational and symbolic ideology measures. 
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identification as a social identity, as well as analyzing its causes and behavioral effects, this article represents a first 
step toward more fully exploiting the theoretical and empirical potential of Social Identity Theory in order to 
improve scholars’ understanding of ideological identification, in general, and symbolic ideology, in particular.   
To further this argument, consider the implications of Self-Categorization Theory (Turner 1985; Turner et 
al. 1987).  SCT is an adaptation of Social Identity Theory that distinguishes itself, in part, by the assumption that 
individuals subjectively evaluate in-groups and out-groups in comparison to the perceived prototype of a 
superordinate category to which both groups belong.  Thus, inter-group discrimination occurs when individuals 
perceive a relevant out-group as deviating from the norms and values of the superordinate group also encompassing 
the individual’s in-group.  If the in-group and out-group are not perceived as belonging to a common superordinate 
group, or if the out-group is perceived to be more relatively prototypical of the superordinate group than the 
individual’s in-group, social discrimination is unlikely to occur.   
This theory has significant implications for understanding, among other things, intra-party ideological 
divisions and their effects on collective action within a party.  After all, party primaries often play out as contests 
between candidates representing opposing ideological factions, both of which struggle not just for the nomination 
but to define the party’s image and expressed principles.  Once the nomination is decided, party leaders and the 
nominee in particular try desperately to heal factional wounds and unite the party to achieve victory in the coming 
general election, as Mitt Romney did in the 2012 presidential election and John McCain did in the 2008 presidential 
election.  But, as Romney and McCain both found out, ideological opponents often resist – if not through outright 
defection than by withholding the fruits of enthusiastic support. 
Self-Categorization Theory is potentially relevant to understanding this process.  For instance, SCT would 
suggest that the most effective way for party leaders to reduce social discrimination against members of the 
victorious intra-party ideological faction – such as withholding means of support or actively promoting defection – 
is to redefine the losing faction’s superordinate category, from one that excludes the nominee to one that includes 
the nominee.  The candidate could do so by engaging in divisive partisan rhetoric that raises the salience of inter-
party differences, or by selecting a vice presidential nominee from the losing ideological faction so that its 
supporters will perceive the party as mutually inclusive.  Also, social identity could be helpful in understanding 
whether, when, and to what degree members of competing intra-party ideological factions agree to reconcile past 
differences and unite for collective action.  I would suspect that ideological social identity negatively predicts 
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reconciliation for members of the losing ideological faction, who fear strengthening the out-group through electoral 
success, and positively predicts reconciliation for members of the winning ideological faction, who hope to 
strengthen the in-group through electoral success. 
Another opportunity for theoretical advancement comes from Mummendey and Wenzel’s (1999) In-Group 
Projection Model.  The IPM posits, in part, that individuals project the characteristics of their subgroup onto the 
superordinate in-group, and therefore view fellow subgroup members as prototypical of the superordinate group and 
members of opposing subgroups as deviant.  The IPM could be helpful in understanding, among other things, 
evaluations of candidate ideology. It is not uncommon for individuals to inaccurately project their ideological 
identification onto a favored candidate (see, for example, Carmines and Berkman 1994), or for popular candidates to 
be perceived by members of different ideological groups as a member of their in-group.  If the IPM is relevant to 
understanding such phenomena, it could be that mischaracterizations of a candidate’s ideology are less the product 
of ignorance or a lack of ideological sophistication than a psychological motivation to project an ideological 
subgroup identity onto the leader of a partisan superordinate group.   
 These are but two examples of how a more explicit and thorough integration of Social Identity Theory 
stands to enrich scholars’ understanding of ideological identification, and particularly symbolic ideology.  More 
direct evidence comes from the results of this analysis, which indicate the credibility and relevance of a social 
identity approach to ideology.    
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Appendix: Survey Experiment Stimuli 
General Election Stimulus 
Suppose an election is being held to determine your state’s next U.S. Senator, and you are a voter in this 
election.  Two candidates, one Democrat (Republican) and one Republican (Democrat), are competing to become 
U.S. Senator. 
Bill Reese is the Democratic (Republican) candidate in this race.  Reese’s campaign has focused on a 
number of issues where he says Republicans (Democrats) have led the nation astray recently by ignoring alternative 
political views.  In order to succeed now and in the future, Reese says the nation must begin to look to Democrats 
(Republicans) for new ideas.  A win by Reese would increase Democrats’ (Republicans’) power in the U.S. 
government, and many people would view it as an indication that voters, at the state and national level, are shifting 
in favor of Democrats’ (Republicans’) positions on the most important issues of the day. 
Peter Keaton is the Republican (Democratic) candidate in this race.  Keaton’s campaign says it is the 
policies supported by Democrats (Republicans) that have led the nation astray from its core principles in recent 
years.  Keaton says that Republicans (Democrats) must be given the opportunity to lead once again if the nation is to 
succeed today and in the years to come.  Keaton’s victory in this election would strengthen Republicans’ 
(Democrats’) ability to shape U.S. government policy, while also proving, in the eyes of many, that the people now 
favor the Republican (Democratic) Party’s approach to resolving the many important challenges faced by voters in 
this state and throughout the nation. 
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Party Primary Stimulus 
Suppose a Republican (Democratic) Party primary is being held in your state to determine the Republican 
(Democratic) nominee for an upcoming U.S. Senate race, and you are a voter in this primary.  Two candidates are 
competing to become the Republican (Democratic) Party’s nominee. 
Bill Reese is viewed as the ideological moderate in this race.  Reese’s campaign has focused on a number 
of issues where he says conservative Republicans (liberal Democrats) have led the party astray recently by ignoring 
alternative ideological views.  In order to succeed now and in the future, Reese says the party must begin to reach 
out to moderate and liberal Republicans (conservative Democrats) for new ideas.  A win by Reese would increase 
moderates’ power in the state party, and many people would view it as an indication that the Republican 
(Democratic) Party, at the state and national level, is shifting in favor of ideological moderates’ positions on the 
most important issues of the day. 
 Peter Keaton is viewed as the ideological conservative (liberal) in this race.  Keaton’s campaign says it is 
the policies supported by moderate and liberal Republicans (conservative Democrats) that have led the party astray 
from its conservative (liberal) principles in recent years.  Keaton says that conservative Republicans (liberal 
Democrats) must be given the opportunity to lead once again if the party is to win this and other upcoming elections.  
Keaton’s victory in this primary would strengthen conservatives’ (liberals’) ability to shape party policy, while also 
proving, in the eyes of many, that the Republican (Democratic) Party now favors an ideologically conservative 
(liberal) approach to resolving the many important challenges faced by voters in this state and throughout the nation. 
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Tables 
 
Parameter Aggregate ISI Conservative ISI Liberal ISI Moderate ISI 
Gen. Election Conditiona 0.293* 0.407* 0.079 0.276* 
  
(0.085) (0.139) (0.186) (0.131) 
Party Primary Conditiona 0.277* 0.304* 0.134 0.339* 
  
(0.085) (0.136) (0.185) (0.135) 
Idg. Self-Placement (Folded) 0.260* 0.542* 0.252* - 
  
(0.038) (0.096) (0.126) - 
Party Identification (Folded) 0.178* 0.103 0.225* 0.215* 
  
(0.038) (0.060) (0.088) (0.062) 
Age 0.005* 0.007 0.004 0.001 
  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Education 0.020 0.013 0.079* 0.009 
  
(0.019) (0.031) (0.040) (0.030) 
Race (White) 0.140 0.215 0.153 -0.009 
  
(0.083) (0.155) (0.169) (0.125) 
Gender (Female) -0.147* -0.164 -0.273 -0.022 
  
(0.071) (0.119) (0.154) (0.113) 
Religiosity 0.012 0.027 -0.052 0.004 
  
(0.020) (0.033) (0.047) (0.033) 
Household Income -0.007 0.013 -0.026 -0.015 
  
(0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
News Source: Local TV -0.033 0.092 -0.039 -0.154* 
  
(0.033) (0.052) (0.079) (0.051) 
News Source: Network TV 0.009 -0.065 0.091 0.094 
  
(0.030) (0.046) (0.069) (0.049) 
News Source: Cable TV 0.079* 0.114* -0.038 0.093* 
  
(0.025) (0.039) (0.060) (0.042) 
News Source: Radio 0.030 0.001 0.005 0.034 
  
(0.022) (0.034) (0.047) (0.036) 
News Source: Newspaper -0.020 -0.065 -0.015 0.046 
  
(0.022) (0.035) (0.048) (0.038) 
News Source: Blogs 0.073* 0.027 0.149* 0.042 
  
(0.026) (0.040) (0.054) (0.045) 
Constant 2.856 2.040 2.825 3.307 
  
(0.199) (0.382) (0.508) (0.302) 
     Adjusted R-Squared 0.142 0.158 0.107 0.104 
N   1032 426 244 362 
Table 1: Predictors of the Strength of Ideological Social Identity 
 
Ideological social identity (ISI) scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it 
feels to me like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’/ moderates’] successes are my successes.”  
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.   
 
ISI scores constitute the dependent variable in each model.  All participants are included in Column 1’s model.  The 
models presented in Columns 2, 3, and 4 include only conservatives, liberals, and moderates, respectively.  
 
aParticipants were randomly assigned to one of three electoral conditions, varying exposure to hypothetical electoral 
competition.  The excluded category in this analysis is control group participants, who received no stimulus. 
 
Entries are linear regression coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses.  *Significant at 0.05. 
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Parameter 
Vote Choice:  
Hypothetical Senate Election 
Vote Choice:  
2008 Presidential Election 
Candidate Order -0.214 - 
 (0.395) - 
Age 0.028* -0.004 
   (0.012) (0.010) 
Education 0.261* 0.220* 
   (0.087) (0.090) 
Race (White) 0.186 -1.275* 
   (0.493) (0.383) 
Gender (Female) -0.129 0.597* 
   (0.417) (0.284) 
Religiosity -0.060 -0.105 
 (0.108) (0.096) 
Household Income -0.061 -0.054 
 (0.054) (0.045) 
Party Identification -0.770* -0.823* 
   (0.134) (0.086) 
Partisan Social Identity 0.251 -0.062 
   (0.183) (0.157) 
Ideological Self-Placement 0.800 -0.292 
   (0.546) (0.674) 
Ideological Social Identity 0.982 0.215 
   (0.538) (0.779) 
ISI * Self-Placement -0.301* -0.085 
   (0.131) (0.160) 
Constant -2.769 4.487 
   (2.541) (2.802) 
   
N 317 763 
Log-Likelihood -131.230 -222.806 
Table 2: Predictors of Vote Choice in Hypothetical and Actual Elections. 
 
The dependent variable in each model is coded 1 for Democratic vote choice, 0 for Republican vote choice, and 
missing otherwise.  The model presented in Column 1 predicts vote choice among participants randomly 
assigned to an experimental condition describing a hypothetical U.S. Senate election between Democratic and 
Republican candidates.  The model presented in Column 2 predicts vote choice in the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election, among all participants who reported voting for Barack Obama or John McCain in that election. 
 
a Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental stimulus describing the Republican candidate before 
the Democratic candidate (coded 1), or the Democratic candidate before the Republican candidate (coded 0). 
 
Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses.  *Significant at 0.05. 
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Ideological Self-Placement 
ISI = 4 
(Neutral) 
ISI = 7 
(Maximum) Difference 
2008 Presidential Election    
Very Liberal 89.1% 92.4% 3.3% 
Liberal 81.3% 83.3% 2.0% 
Slightly Liberal 69.9% 67.4% -2.5% 
Moderate 55.2% 46.0% -9.2% 
Slightly Conservative 39.6% 26.0% -13.6% 
Conservative 25.9% 12.7% -13.2% 
Very Conservative 15.7% 5.7% -10.0% 
      
Hypothetical Senate Election    
Very Liberal 68.5% 94.4% 25.9% 
Liberal 59.1% 81.9% 22.8% 
Slightly Liberal 49.1% 55.0% 5.9% 
Moderate 39.1% 24.8% -14.3% 
Slightly Conservative 30.0% 8.2% -21.8% 
Conservative 22.2% 2.4% -19.8% 
Very Conservative 16.0% 0.7% -15.3% 
Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Democratic Vote Choice, by Ideological Self-Placement and Strength of 
Ideological Social Identity 
 
Predicted probabilities are based upon results from the logistic regression models presented in Table 2, 
which predict vote choice among all participants who reported voting for Barack Obama or John McCain 
in the 2008 presidential election (top) and among all participants assigned to an experimental condition 
describing a hypothetical U.S. Senate election between Democratic and Republican candidates (bottom).  
The dependent variable in each model is coded 1 for Democratic vote choice, 0 for Republican vote 
choice, and missing otherwise. 
 
When calculating predicted probabilities, all variables are held at their mean or modal values, except for 
ideological self-placement and ideological social identity (ISI).  Ideological social identity scores represent 
a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale, with the 
following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it feels to me like a 
personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’/ moderates’] successes are my successes.”  
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.   
 
Column 1 presents the predicted probability of Democratic vote choice, across ideological self-placement, 
for participants who score at the neutral point of the ISI scale (4).  Column 2 presents predicted 
probabilities of the same, for participants who score at the highest point on the ISI scale (7).  Column 3 
quantifies the difference in predicted probability of Democratic vote choice when moving from the 
midpoint to the maximum on the ISI scale.     
 
  
 36 
 
Figures 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Kernel Density Plot of Ideological Social Identity Scores, Aggregated and by Ideological Group. 
  
Ideological social identity scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree) scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ 
moderates], it feels to me like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’ / moderates’] successes 
are my successes.”  Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.   
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Figure 2: Interaction Effect of Ideological Self-Placement and Ideological Social Identity on Vote Choice in a 
Hypothetical U.S. Senate Election  
 
The above figure is based upon logistic regression model results presented in the first column of Table 2, predicting 
vote choice among participants assigned to an experimental condition describing a hypothetical U.S. Senate 
election between Democratic and Republican candidates.  The dependent variable is coded one for Democratic vote 
choice, zero for Republican vote choice, and missing otherwise. 
 
To evaluate a hypothesized interaction effect, Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on 
vote choice across levels of ideological social identity (ISI).  The solid line in this figure represents the marginal 
effect of self-placement on vote choice in the hypothetical Senate election, as a participant’s ISI increases, and the 
dashed lines represent the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for the marginal effect.  Ideological self-
placement’s effect on vote choice is statistically significant at any point on the ideological social identity scale that 
the 95% confidence intervals do not include a value of zero. 
 
ISI scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it feels to me 
like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’ / moderates’] successes are my successes.”  
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.   
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Figure 3: Interaction Effect of Ideological Self-Placement and Ideological Social Identity on Vote Choice in the 
2008 U.S. Presidential Election 
 
The above figure is based upon logistic regression model results presented in the second column of Table 2, 
predicting vote choice among all participants who reported voting for Barack Obama or John McCain in the 2008 
presidential election.  The dependent variable is coded one for Democratic vote choice, zero for Republican vote 
choice, and missing otherwise. 
 
To evaluate a hypothesized interaction effect, Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on 
vote choice across levels of ideological social identity (ISI).  The solid line in this figure represents the marginal 
effect of self-placement on vote choice in the 2008 presidential election, as a participant’s ISI increases, and the 
dashed lines represent the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for the marginal effect.  Ideological self-
placement’s effect on vote choice is statistically significant at any point on the ideological social identity scale that 
the 95% confidence intervals do not include a value of zero. 
 
ISI scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it feels to me 
like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’ / moderates’] successes are my successes.”  
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.   
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